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Under Australian law, a tenant complaining of nuisance caused by another tenant
traditionally had no recourse to the lessor unless the lessor actively participated in the
nuisance. A recent Queensland Court of Appeal decision, Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v
Marklea Pty Ltd, has found that a lessor who fails to take steps to control a tenant's
nuisance may be liable to other tenants for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
This paper considers the recent decision in light of common law developments in
Australia, England and the United States, including the American concept of
constructive eviction.
[1] INTRODUCTION
1
All leases, commercial and residential, have certain covenants implied by the common
law, subject to any express agreement by the parties. A les ee’s covenants are:
(1) to use the leased premises in a tenant-like manner; and
(2) to yield up possession to the lessor at the end of the term of the lease.
2
A lessor covenants:
(1) that in the case of furnished dwellings, that they are reasonably fit for
habitation;
(2) not to derogate from the grant of the lease; and
(3) for quiet enjoyment.
3
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The covenant for quiet enjoyment is an important obligation of lessor, conferring on the
lessee the right to obtain remedies for acts or omissions that breach the covenant.
4
As with all law relating to real property in Australia, the law as to covenants implied into
leases derives from the English law of landlord and tenant. However, today’s courts are
now being influenced by decisions of other jurisdictions, in particular decisions of the
courts in the United States. The decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Aussie
Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd1 is a recent example of where cases decided in the
United States found favour with the court. The case is important in the development of a
lessor’s liability under the covenant for quiet enjoyment. This article will examine the
scope and the development of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, with reference to case
law of the United States as a comparison.
[2] THE COVENANT FOR QUIET ENJOYMENT
5
In the modern commercial lease it is usual for the covenant for quiet enjoyment to be
express. An example of the usual covenant contained in a commercial lease is:
The Lessor covenants with the Lessee that whilst the lessee complies with the
financial and other obligations under this Lease, the lessee may occupy and have
the use and enjoyment of the Leased Premises for the term of this Lease without
interruption or disturbance from the Lessor and other persons lawfully claiming
through or under the Lessor.2
6
The term "quiet enjoyment" is not used as in the sense of being free from noise, but is
used as in free from interruption. As Pearson LJ explained in K nny v Preen:
I think the word "enjoy" used in this connection is a translation of the Latin word
fruor and refers to the exercise and use of the right and having the full benefit of
it, rather than deriving pleasure from it.3
7
The covenant for quiet enjoyment is a guarantee by the lessor that the lessee will be
entitled to uninterrupted enjoyment of the demised premises for the term of the lease.
By granting a lease, a lessor gives the lessee the right to possession for the term and
warrants that the lessee’s rights in relation to possession will not be interfered with.4
8
The protection of the covenant only applies to lawful acts of persons claiming through
the lessor.5 Should the interference or disturbance be an unlawful act, by a person
claiming through the lessor, the lessor will not be in breach of the covenant. In such
circumstances, the lessee’s remedy will be in tort but will include the lessor if the
unlawful act was authorised by the lessor.6
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9
Another qualification, and the most important one for the purposes of this article, is that
the covenant is limited in its application to acts of the lessor or those claiming through
the lessor.7 Interruptions and disturbances caused by persons having title paramount to
the lessor are not within the application of the covenant.8 For example, in the case of
Besley v Besley9, a lessee granted a sublease for a term longer than the term under the
head lease. It was held that there was no breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment by
the sublessor when the sublessee was evicted by the head lessor upon expiry of the
term of the head lease. The head lessor’s title was superior to that of the sublessor and
therefore the interference was not a breach.10
10
If the lessor has not by its own actions created the interference which is an alleged
breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, the lessee must establish that the
interference was created by a party claiming through the lessor. A lessor will not be
liable for the acts of strangers, assignees of the reversion, nor for the wrongful acts of
persons purporting to act for a lessor without the lessor’s authority or acquiescence.11
11
If possible a lessor will deny liability on the grounds that the acts complained of were not
committed by any person claiming through them. It is, therefore, important to establish
the boundaries of the lessor’s liability.
[2.1] Acts by the Lessor
12
The most obvious breach of the covenant is where the lessor interferes with the
lessee’s quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the premises in an attempt to make the
premises uninhabitable. Such interference must be substantial, trivial interference is not
actionable.12 In Browne v Fowler13 Parker J held that:
...to constitute a breach of [a covenant for quiet enjoyment] there must be some
physical interference with the enjoyment of the demised premises, and that a
mere interference with the comfort of persons using the demised premises by the
creation of a personal annoyance such as might arise from noise, invasion of
privacy or otherwise is not enough.14
13
In that case, an external staircase was erected to allow entry to a flat on the first floor of
the building. The plaintiff, the tenant on the ground floor, claimed breach of the covenant
for quiet enjoyment as the use of the staircase seriously affected the plaintiff’s privacy
as persons using the staircase could see directly into two bedrooms of the plaintiff.
14
Direct physical interference, such as where a lessor removed the doors and windows to
coerce the lessee into giving up the lease, will amount to a breach.15 Allowing rainwater
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to enter and damage the leased premises will also amount to a breach of the
covenant.16
15
The law has developed since the case of Browne v Fowler17 and direct physical
interference is no longer a requirement in establishing a breach of the covenant. In JC
Berndt Pty Ltd v Walsh18, Walters J cited with approval Harrison Ainslie & Co v Lord
Muncaster19:
...there need not be an actual interference with the possession or occupancy of
the premises demised, but embraces "every interruption to a beneficial
enjoyment of the thing demised, whether accidental or wrongful, or in whatever
way the interruption may be caused."20
16
This view was supported by Lord Denning in McCall v Abelesz:
...[the covenant] is not confined to direct physical interference by the landlord. It
extends to any conduct of the landlord or his agents which interferes with the
tenants’ freedom of action in exercising his rights as tenant...It covers, therefore,
any acts calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the tenant, or his
family.21
17
Since the decision of Harmer v Jumbil (Nigeria) Tin Areas Ltd,22 the argument that there
must be some physical interference has ceased to be tenable. Younger LJ stated in that
case, that if the purpose of the grant is frustrated by acts which involved no physical
interference, but were effective as physical interference , there was no logical reason to
distinguish the situations.23 For example, in the decision of Haig v Chesney24, an
interference with the light was found to be a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment,
although there was no actual physical interference.
18
Problems arise when the interference or disturbance is not committed by the lessor. If
the lessor does not actively participate or authorise the acts complained of, there will be
difficulty in proving that there is a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.
[2.2] Acts by Third Parties
19
Most texts concerning the law of landlord and tenant state that the covenant for quiet
enjoyment can only be breached by a lessor or those claiming under the lessor. A
common situation is where a lessee’s enjoyment of the demised premises is interfered
with by the actions of another lessee of a common lessor. Until recently, a lessor could
only be liable for such actions if the lessor actively encouraged or participated in the
breach.25 Merely being aware of the interference by the other lessee and taking no
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steps to prevent it, did not render the lessor liable for breach of the covenant for quiet
enjoyment. The only exception to this rule was if the common lessor let the adjoining
premises for a purpose which would necessarily involve a nuisance.
20
In Malzy v Eichholz26, Eichholz demised certain premises to Malzy for a term of 21
years. Eichholz covenanted that by paying the rent and performing the covenants,
Malzy might occupy the premises for the duration of the term without any interruption or
disturbance by Eichholz or any person or persons claiming from, through or under him.
Four years into the lease, Eichholz let the adjoining premises to a dealer in fine arts.
This lessee covenanted not to permit or suffer to be done any act which might be an
annoyance or disturbance of the lessor or his tenants.
21
The lessee permitted mock auctions to be carried out on the premises in such a way
that they constituted a public nuisance. Eichholz wrote frequently to the lessee to
remonstrate, but took no active steps to end the nuisance. Malzy alleged that his
business was seriously interfered with, damaged by the crowds and disturbances, and
brought an action against Eichholz alleging a breach of the covenant for quiet
enjoyment.
22
The court held, that for the lessor to be liable for a nuisance committed by somebody
else, the lessor must have actively participated in the nuisance. Lord Cozens-Hardy MR
stated:
...there is no authority and no principle for holding a landlord liable under a
covenant for quiet enjoyment - that is to say, that he has done anything which
renders him liable to damages under the covenant in respect of quiet enjoyment -
merely because he knows of what is being done and does not take any steps to
prevent what is being done. There must be something much more than that.
There must be something which can fairly amount to his doing the acts
complained of, either by actual participation by himself or his agents, or by what
Lord Collins called active participation in that which was complained of.27
23
In that case, the lessor accepting the rent with knowledge of the nuisance did not
amount to the lessor authorising the nuisance to be carried on.28 It was held that a
lessor was not liable in damages to a lessee under the covenant for a nuisance caused
by another lessee, merely because the lessor knew that the latter was causing the
nuisance and took no steps to prevent what was being done.29 His Lordship
distinguished the difference between the situation where a lessee’s business may or
may not involve or create a nuisance, and where premises were let for a purpose which
necessarily involved a nuisance.30
24
However, despite the common citing of the case M lzy v Eichholz in texts from Australia
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and the United Kingdom, the decision has seldom be relied on. This observation was
made in the recent Court of Appeal decision of Chartered Trust plc v Davies.31 In that
case the plaintiff claimed arrears of rent from the defendant who had withheld rent and
disclaimed the lease, contending that the lessors had derogated from their grant by
failing to control the nuisance of another lessee. Henry LJ stated:
I take the law to be clear that, where the mere fact of letting the landlord’s
retained and neighbouring land is not a derogation from his grant to the original
tenant, then the landlord will only be vicariously liable for the activities of his
tenant on the land where he has consented to (or, in the language of nuisance,
continued or adopted) them. What I would question is whether Malzy v Eichhloz
is authority for the proposition that the landlord is never obliged to take any action
himself to restrain those activities. I question whether so sweeping a proposition
can be the law today.32
25
A commercial lease will usually include a provision expressly prohibiting a lessee from
committing acts of nuisance in respect of the interests of the other lessees and third
party occupiers of adjoining property. As Blackburn J in Harris v James33 pointed out, it
would be very difficult to establish that a lessor has impliedly waived this provision, even
though the lessor may be aware of the potential nuisance being committed by the co-
lessees. Duncan also explains that the courts, until now, have preferred to sheet the
blame and the liability for any loss to an adjoining lessee rather than the common
lessor.34 For example, in Matania v National Provincial Bank Ltd,35 a lessee alleged
breach by the lessor of the covenant for quiet enjoyment by the actions of another
lessee occupying part of the same premises. The lessee carried out alterations to the
premises which interfered with the plaintiff’s profession of music teacher. The court held
that:
It is no breach if the interruption is caused by an adjoining lessee if the lease,
though granted by the same lessor, does not authorise the act causing the
interruption.36
26
Therefore, the court held that as the lessor had not in fact authorised the alterations
carried out by the lessee, there was no breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment
owed by the lessor to the plaintiff.
27
As to interruptions or disturbances by acts of other lessees of a common lessor, the
state of law is undergoing change in many jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom,
New Zealand and Queensland, but with differing approaches. The recent decision of the
Queensland Court of Appeal in Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd37, has moved
away from the traditional approach to the problem and has looked to decisions of the
courts in the United States for guidance.
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[3] BREACH OF THE COVENANT FOR QUIET ENJOYMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
28
As in Australia, the law of landlord and tenant in the United States derives from the
English law. A lessor will not be liable for the tortious acts of lessees unless the lessor
has authorised, consented to or c nnived the acts.38 Formal leases in the United States,
commonly contain an express covenant by the lessor for quiet enjoyment and most
courts agree that in the absence of an express provision, the covenant will be implied.39
For there to be a breach of the implied covenant, the disturbance or interference must
be shown to have been the act of the lessor, or persons claiming under the lessor.
Therefore, acts of other lessees in other parts of the premises will not ordinarily
constitute a breach of the covenant.
29
However, the position of the law in the United States is different to that in Australia and
England, in respect of interruptions or disturbances by other lessees of a common
lessor. Where a lessor has no control over the actions of the lessees, any acts,
disturbances or interferences by the lessee cannot be treated as a breach of the
covenant for quiet enjoyment.40 Where the lessor has expressly or impliedly authorised
the tortious acts by overt approval or by failing to take action to abate the acts upon
having notice of them, should the lessee break the term of the lease, then the lessee is
able to raise the defence of constructive eviction in any action by the lessor to recover
rent for the remainder of the term.41
[3.1] Constructive Eviction
30
In the United States, a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment is often relied upon in
actions by lessees when alleging actual or constructive eviction. Constructive eviction is
any disturbance by the lessor, or by the lessor’s procurement, that renders the leased
premises unfit for the purpose for which they were leased, or deprives the tenant of the
beneficial enjoyment of the premises.42 There is no constructive eviction unless the
lessee surrenders possession of the premises within a reasonable time of the condition
arising.43 If a lessee can establish that there has been a constructive eviction, the
lessee’s liability for rent is suspended and the lessee is not liable for any damage to the
premises after the surrender of possession.44
[3.1.1] Case law
31
In Tudor City Ninth Unit v Perkett45, a lessor brought an action for rent against a former
lessee who alleged that he had been forced to move from the demised premises due to
the offensive behaviour of the other lessees. The court held that although a lessor
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controls the building, a lessor does not control the lessees. Even though the lessor
knew of the conduct and took no steps to abate it, it was necessary for the lessee to
prove that in some manner the lessor was responsible for the conduct of the other
lessees. By failing to prove that element, no breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment
could be established.
32
In Bruckner v Helfaer46, it was held that failing to stop disturbances caused by adjoining
lessees was a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. In that case the lessee made
complaints to the lessor and gave reasonable notice of the intention to vacate the
premises. The court held that as the lease involved a high-class apartment, it was the
responsibility of the lessor, upon becoming aware of the disturbances, to ensure that the
lessee received the quiet enjoyment to which he was entitled.
33
In some jurisdictions of the United States, an eviction, actual or constructive, of the
lessee is a condition precedent to an action for damages for a breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment.47 However, in Moe v Sprankle48, the court held that the lessee was
entitled to damages for breach of the covenant although the lessee remained in
possession of the demised premises. The court pointed out that eviction was not a
condition precedent, although a lessee who remained in possession was precluded
from defending an action based on failure to pay rent.
34
Blackett v Olanoff49 concerned an action by lessors for rent against residential lessees,
who raised constructive eviction as a defence. Loud penetrating noise emanated from a
cocktail lounge adjacent to a residential building, both buildings being owned by the
same lessor. The lease between the lessors and the lessee of the cocktail lounge
provided that the operations of the lounge would be conducted so as to not disturb the
adjacent residential lessees. The residential lessees made frequent complaints to the
lessors, who attempted to control the noise without success. Several of the residential
lessees vacated the premises and the lessors brought actions for non-payment of rent.
The lessees claimed in constructive eviction by an alleged breach of the implied
covenant for quiet enjoyment.
35
The court held that the lessors had it within their control to correct the condition which
caused the residential lessees to vacate their premises. By introducing a commercial
activity into an area leased for residential purposes, the lessors were aware of the
potential disturbances to the residential lessees.
Because the disturbing condition was the natural and probable consequence of
the landlords permitting the lounge to operate where it did and because the
landlords could control the actions at the lounge, they should not be entitled to
collect rent for residential premises which were not reasonably habitable.50
36
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This reasoning is in accord with the comments of Lord Cozens-Hardy MR in Malzy v
Eichholz51, where his Lordship stated that a lessor would be liable for a nuisance of an
adjoining lessee if the premises were let for a purpose which necessarily would involve
a nuisance.52
37
In the case of Bocchini v Gorn Management Co53, Bocchini rented an apartment from
Gorn Management. Bocchini complained to Gorn Management of "continued unabated
noise" from the upstairs apartment, making it impossible for her and her daughter to get
adequate sleep or to quietly enjoy the premises. Gorn Management acknowledged the
problem and promised to take action. However, the problem continued and eventually
Gorn Management informed Bocchini that it was not going to take any action regarding
the problem. Eventually Bocchini and her daughter permanently vacated the apartment.
Gorn Management brought an action seeking lost rent and other damages.
38
The court acknowledged the covenant of quiet enjoyment is implied in every lease,
absent some provision in the lease negating the implied covenant.54 Gor  Management,
as lessor, argued that it could not be in breach of the covenant as the conditions were
created by another lessee. The court stated that traditionally a lessor:
...is not responsible for the activities of his tenants. The mere existence of a legal
relationship between a landlord and tenant is not sufficient to impose a duty on
the landlord concerning tenant conduct. The test is frequently fashioned to
require both the landlord’s knowledge and permission or authorization of the
conduct before it will be attributable to him.55
39
However, the court stated that the rule, although followed by many courts, was not
universal and had been increasingly abandoned to create a state of "flux and disarray"
in the law.56 Instead of focusing on whether the lessor had approved of the conduct of
the lessee, the more important issue was whether the lessor was in a position to correct
or terminate it. Therefore, the court held that if through the terms of the lease, the
lessor:
...has that ability, the thought is that he ought not to be able to escape his
obligations under a covenant of quiet enjoyment by steadfastly refusing to
exercise his authority.57
40
The court reasoned that the purpose of the restrictions contained in the lease, was to
permit lessors to control the conduct of lessees and thereby protect other lessee’s rights
to quiet enjoyment.58 The question of whether a lessor would be expected to exercise
control in the absence of a specific provision in the lease, was left open. In dicta, the
court suggested that the lessor’s authority to control lessees’ conduct need not be
derived from something in the lease or parol to the lease.59
41
National Law Review – www.nlr.com.au
©LawNow Ltd 2000.  All Rights Reserved.  Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism or review as permitted by law, this article may not be
reproduced by any process without written permission.
The courts in the United States have had no difficulty in finding a common lessor liable
for nuisances created by lessees. In Eskanos & Supperstein v Irwin60, constructive
eviction was alleged by a commercial lessee due to the disturbing conduct of another
commercial lessee in a shopping centre. The court stated the lessee had to prove that
noises complained of made the leased premises unsuitable and that the lessor could
control the noise. In Rockpose Assoc v Peters61, the court held that by failing to stop the
disturbing conduct of a lessee, the lessor assented to that conduct, thereby amounting
to constructive eviction. As one author asserts, the adoption of the modern view of a
breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment and constructive eviction by the courts is
consistent with the "expectations and realities of the modern urban landlord-tenant
relationship."62
[4] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
42
In the last twelve months there has been important development and change in the
basis of liability of a common lessor for the acts of lessees in the United Kingdom,
Queensland and New Zealand.
[4.1] New Zealand
43
A recent decision of Elias J of the High Court of Auckland, is an example of the move
away from the traditional approach to the lessor’s covenant for quiet enjoyment. In
Norden v Bluepoint Enterprises Ltd63, the respondents, a personnel agency, were the
lessees of a building, the sole use permitted by the lease being "general office
accommodation". At the time of the respondent’s lease, the first two floors of the
building were leased to a record retailing firm and a music shop. The fourth floor was
leased to persons who conducted a hotel personnel placement business. This lease
was assigned to a third party who ran an escort agency called Karisma. Upon learning
of the new tenant’s business, the respondent wrote to the appellant, the lessor,
opposing the assignment, alleging that the escort agency was in fact a brothel and that
by consenting to the assignment the appellant would be in derogation of the lease with
the respondent.
44
On 26 May 1990, the respondent vacated the premises and returned the keys on 1
June 1990. The appellant commenced an action for damages, rent, interest and costs
from 1 June 1990 to August 1991, when the premises were leased to another lessee.
The respondent alleged that the appellant had acted in derogation of their grant or were
in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment contained in the lease. The respondent
gave evidence that:
...when Karisma started business there was a stream of "unsavoury and
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disgusting-looking men and women" going up and down the common
stairs...[The respondent] also complained about the noise of showers, whips, and
occasional moaning, and "funny smells which could have been incense or
oils"....it was not possible to lock the lobby doors which meant it was used as a
urinal and place to vomit...Staff morale suffered, and [the respondent] was greatly
concerned about the effect upon [the respondent’s] customers.64
45
The High Court held that the appellant was in breach. As to the appellant being in
derogation of the grant, the court stated:
The findings of fact made by the Judge as to the appellant’s knowledge, together
with their refusal to exercise powers reasonably open to them as landlord to
determine the taint, its conduct which strikes at the fundamental obligation under
the lease to [the respondent]. In such circumstance, whether or not [the
respondent] had remedies directly against Karisma does not detract from the fact
that the landlord itself had derogated from the grant by its conduct.65
46
And in these circumstances, the derogation was also a breach of the covenant for quiet
enjoyment, "because there was a ‘substantial interruption which prevents the lessee
from enjoying its premises for the very purpose for which they were leased’"66. Th
forced association with the brothel was more than a mere interference with the
respondent’s comfort or amenity. Elias J held that by holding the appellant to be in
breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, did not impose liability for the tortious acts
of its lessee, Karisma. What actually constituted the breach of the covenant for quiet
enjoyment was the appellant’s countenancing a use wholly inconsistent with the
respectable business of the respondent. It was the actual leasing to Karisma that was
the breach of the covenant.
47
As in the decisions in the United States discussed above, the appellant had the ability to
control its lessees as the lease contained a provision that lessees would not carry on, or
permit to be carried on, any conduct, annoyance, nuisance or disturbance that would
interfere with adjoining occupiers of the building. Elias J did not question whether the
failure by the appellant to enforce the lease provision and exert control over the conduct
of Karisma amounted to a breach of the covenant owed to the respondent. However,
the case shows a willingness to hold a common lessor liable for the acts of lessees,
whereas previously, the courts have preferred a lessee to seek remedies against the
offending co-lessee.
48
The decision of Norden v Bluepoint Enterprises Ltd67 was handed down in June 1996.
Several months later, the issue of the liability of a common lessor for alleged breach of
the covenant for quiet enjoyment by the acts of another lessee, came before the Court
of Appeal of Queensland.
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[4.2] Queensland
49
In contrast to the New Zealand High Court decision, the Queensland Court of Appeal in
Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd68 looked to the development of the liability of
landowners for nuisance created on their land by third parties and the approach of the
courts in the United States.
[4.2.1] Liability of landowners in nuisance
50
The development of liability of the owner of land in nuisance for acts done by a
trespasser shows a move away from the traditional approach, which insisted on there
being evidence of authorisation or active participation by the owner.
51
In the Queensland case of Wilkinson v Joyceman69, the Court of Appeal held that a
landowner owes a duty of care to a person injured by the reason of activities known to
be dangerous, conducted by persons who are not the servants or agents of the
landowner, on the owner’s land where the owner knows that reasonable precautions for
safety have not been taken. Similarly, in R v Shorrock70, the English Court of Appeal
found that a landowner who had knowingly permitted a public nuisance to be committed
on his land, was liable for that nuisance. If a landowner knows, or has the means of
knowledge available, that there was a real risk that a nuisance would result from the
activities carried out on the land, the owner will be liable.
52
The English Court of Appeal adopted the principle in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan71,
where the House of Lords held that an occupier of land "continues" a nuisance if, with
knowledge or presumed knowledge of the existence of the nuisance, the occupier fails
to take reasonable steps to bring the nuisance to an end.72 The liability of the landowner
has been applied by analogy to acts of lessees of a common lessor in determining
whether there was a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment in the United Kingdom
and in Queensland.
[4.2.2] Common lessor’s liability for nuisance
53
In the English decision of Chartered Trust plc v Davies73, the Court of Appeal
distinguished the case of Malzy v Eichholz74, on the basis of its facts and the
development in the law of nuisance since that case was decided.75 In the case before
the court, the lessor controlled a shopping mall in which the defendants leased
premises. The conduct of business of another lessee, a pawnbroker, restricted the entry
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to the shopping mall as its customers waited in large groups outside. The defendants
alleged that the groups of mainly young men had a deterrent effect upon potential
customers and passing trade was lost. In addition, a coffee shop placed tables and
chairs in the entrance to the mall, obstructing the access to the shops at the back of the
mall.
54
It was argued by the defendants that the shopping mall was legally set up so as to
provide the lessor with the power to make rules and the lessees were charged a service
fee to finance the necessary management. However, instead of utilising its rule-making
powers, the lessor did nothing and allowed the nuisance to continue. Henry LJ stated:
I accept that in order to succeed (whether on derogation from grant or quiet
enjoyment or nuisance) on the basis of a landlord’s failure to act, the tenant must
show that the landlord has a duty to act. ... If a landlord was never required to
take action to protect what he had granted to his tenant, he could render
valueless the protection of his tenant’s business seemingly built-in to the letting
scheme he was marketing. That would offend the principles of fair dealing. There
must come a point where the landlord becomes legally obliged to take action to
protect that which he has granted to his tenant...
Where a landlord is granting leases in his shopping mall, over which he has
maintained control, and charged a service charge therefor, it is simply no answer
to say a tenant’s sole protection is his own ability and willingness to bring
individual action. Litigation is too expensive, too uncertain and offers no proper
protection against, say, trespassing and threatening members of the public. The
duty to act should lie with the landlord.76
55
By failing to act, the lessors made the leased premises materially less fit for the purpose
for which the premises were let. The failure to put an end to the nuisance amounted to
the lessors continuing the nuisance and derogating from their grant and the lessees
were entitled to take the failure as a repudiation of the lease.
56
The move away from the requirement of authorisation or participation by a landowner to
establish liability was approved of and followed by the Queensland Court of Appeal. In
the decision of Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd77, it was held that the lessor
was in breach of an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment by failing to take steps to put
a stop to the nuisance created by one of its tenants. The court followed the recent
decisions in England and the United States, as discussed above, by rejecting the
traditional view that the lessor is not liable for the actions of tenants unless the lessor
has sanctioned or authorised such actions. Instead the court approached the issue by
having regard to the control over the tenant that the lessor was capable of exercising.
The decision is an important development in the law relating to leases and therefore
warrants detailed discussion.
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[4.2.2.1] The facts
57
The plaintiff, which was in the business of manufacturing and selling new and repaired
canvas goods, entered into a three lease with the defendant, to commence on 1 April
1992. By clause 4 of the agreement, the plaintiff undertook not to use the premises for
any purpose other than the "manufacturing or sale of new/repaired canvas
awnings/annexes and camping equipment". Business was carried on at the demised
premises by the plaintiff until March or April 1995. At that time, the plaintiff vacated the
premises, alleging that the activities of the adjoining tenant made working conditions
difficult and caused a decrease in profits.
58
The adjoining tenant Top Flight, a firm which manufactured timber staircases, entered
the premises in December 1992. Power saws, sanders and spindle planers were used
in its business and these activities created dust, sawdust and noise, which the plaintiff
claimed interfered with its business.
59
The two sets of leased premises were separated by partitions which did not reach to the
common roof of the building. Roller doors on both premises were kept open to facilitate
ventilation during working hours. As a consequence, sawdust passed into the plaintiff’s
premises, where it soiled or stained the canvas products, decreasing their value. In
addition, the plaintiff alleged that the noise of the spindle planer made ordinary speech
inaudible on the its premises, forcing them to speak to clients in the office or outside.
This excessive noise resulted in a high turnover of staff employed by the plaintiff,
increased absences from work due to headaches and a loss in customers who left
without making a purchase, unable to stand the noise.
60
The trial judge held that the defendant was liable for damages and interest for breach of
covenant as lessor. On appeal the plaintiff and the defendant challenged the judge’s
assessment of damages.
[4.2.2.2] The issue
61
Under a lease for land, the lessor has the implied covenants not to derogate from the
grant and quiet enjoyment by the tenant. It is well established by O’Keefe v Williams78,
that where the lessor has contracted to give exclusive occupation of land, "there is to be
an implied obligation in the nature of a promise not to disturb that occupation"79 and that
such implied obligation was "that the lessor shall neither disturb the possession himself
nor authorise its disturbance by others".80
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McPherson JA stated that the issue was whether the acts of the adjoining tenant and
the consequences of those acts, were such "as to disturb the plaintiff’s occupation of the
premises in a way that involved the defendant landlord in legal responsibility for the loss
alleged to have ensued."81 This involved two inquiries: first, whether the extent of the
disturbance amounted to a breach of the lessor’s implied obligation owed to the plaintiff;
and secondly, whether the defendant can be liable for the actions of one of its tenants.
63
By virtue of clause 4 of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, the
plaintiff was bound to use the premises for manufacture and sale of canvas goods.
McPherson JA referred to the case of Browne v Fowler82, in which Parker J stated :
...if the grant or demise be made for a particular purpose, the grantor or lessor
comes under an obligation not to use the land retained by him in such a way as
to render the land granted or demised unfit or materially less fit for the particular
purpose for which the grant or devise was made.83
64
McPherson JA did not consider that in order to establish a breach of the lessor’s implied
covenant that there must be "practical frustration" of the purpose of the lease where the
claim is for damages.84 It is not necessary for the interference to render it impracticable
or uneconomic for the tenant to carry on business. Evidence before the trial judge was
that the adjoining tenant was in breach of the Nois Abatement Act 1979 (Qld) and it
was accepted that the premises leased by the plaintiff had become unsuitable, rather
than merely "less than ideal". The trial judge had found that there had been a
"substantial interference" with the right of occupation rendering the premises
"substantially less fit" for the purpose for which they were let. McPherson JA concluded
that when all of the matters were brought into account, the trial judge was justified in
finding that the plaintiff’s occupation had been substantially interfered with by the
activities of the adjoining tenant.
[4.2.2.3] The liability of the lessor
65
As discussed above, earlier authorities suggest that the lessor can only be liable if the
interferences in question were authorised by the lessor, or if they were reasonably
foreseeable.85 Discussing today’s acceptance that a person may be liable for the acts of
a trespasser on their land which create a nuisance, McPherson JA concluded that in
such cases, liability depended on the continued occupation and control of the land at
the relevant time. His Honour stated:
The result is that although, apart from any provision in the lease, a lessor
generally loses control over premises once they are let to a tenant, he may
nevertheless remain legally responsible for tortious acts done on the land by a
tenant at least if at the time he agreed to part with possession and control, it was
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reasonably foreseeable that the tenant was likely to do those acts.86
66
The defendant was aware of the problems with the sawdust and the levels of noise from
letters of complaint by the plaintiff. The permitted use of the premises adjoining the
plaintiff’s was defined as "Manufacture of staircases and associated products". It was
therefore reasonably foreseeable by the defendant that unless the problems with the
sawdust were controlled, they were likely to affect the plaintiff’s business.87 As to the
excessive noise caused by the use of the spindle planer, this did not occur until early
1993. Until then the defendant did not know of the intention of its tenant to use that
equipment, but it did become aware of the excessive noise levels in November 1993.
67
By clause 7 of the agreement between the defendant and Top Flight, the adjoining
tenant covenanted not to do or permit any act or thing that might be a nuisance or
cause damage or disturbance to any other tenant or to the lessor. The defendant,
therefore, had the power to put an end to the interferences by enforcing clause 7. By
failing to take any action, the defendant adopted the nuisances once it became aware of
the problems.
[4.2.2.4] The decision
68
It was held that having regard to the control that the defendant was capable of
exercising over its tenant, the defendant was in breach of its implied covenant not to
derogate its grant.88 McPherson JA referred to the recent decisions of R v Shorrock89,
Blackett v Olanoff90 and Bocchini v Gorn Management Co.91 His Honour particularly
favoured a passage by Wilner J in Bocchini v Gorn Management Co:
...The more recent cases dwell not so much on whether the landlord has
approved the conduct of the tenant as whether he is in a position to correct or
terminate it. Where, through leases provisions or otherwise, he has that ability,
the thought is that he would not be able to escape his obligation under a
covenant of quiet enjoyment by steadfastly refusing to exercise his authority.
We adopt that view. It is fair and it is reasonable. The insertion in a lease of a
restriction against excessive noise or other offensive conduct is precisely for the
purpose of enabling the landlord to control that conduct.92
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The Queensland Court of Appeal was unanimous93 in holding that the defendant was
liable for the sawdust and the noise created by its tenant, despite the fact that the
activities had not been encouraged or authorised by the defendant. By being in the
position of being able to correct or terminate such interferences by enforcing the lease
covenant, the defendant, by remaining inactive, was in breach of its implied covenant
not to derogate its grant.
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[5] CONCLUSION
70
The covenant for quiet enjoyment is finally being dragged into modern times and being
construed realistically to meet the demands of commercial necessity. The liability of the
common lessor for nuisance created by its lessee is expanding in step with the liability
of the landowner. The term "fit for the purpose", which is an integral part to derogation
from grant and the related covenant for quiet enjoyment, is being given wider
interpretation than merely being physically fit.94
71
The decision of Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd95 is interesting in that it
changes the liability of lessors for interferences caused by the lessors’ other tenants.
The covenants of derogation of grant and quiet enjoyment, which are implied into all
leases for business efficacy, are not limited to the acts of the lessor or those authorised
by the lessor. If the lessor has retained some control over the leased premises by virtue
of a term in the agreement, the lessor can be liable for the t tious acts of its tenants.
Lessors can no longer afford to remain inactive once aware that a tenant is causing a
breach of the covenants of quiet enjoyment and derogation of grant.
72
Lessors must now exercise care in what activities are permitted on the demised
premises. If it is foreseeable that the activities of a lessee might cause substantial
interference to another lessee, provision should be made in the lease to include
restrictions to ensure that activities will be conducted so as to not cause interference.96
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This new approach to the scope of liability for a breach of the covenant for quiet
enjoyment is a substantial move away from the courts’ usual reluctance to hold a
common lessor liable for the acts of its lessees. Taking into account the usual
provisions of the modern commercial lease such as the express covenant for quiet
enjoyment and provisions prohibiting acts of interference, nuisance or disturbance in
respect of other lessees, it is only logical that a lessor should be expected to enforce the
provisions of the lease and control the acts of lessees if that power is available. This
approach makes even more sense in relation to premises leased by a common lessor
within a complex. Maintaining the control and management of a centre empowers the
lessor with the right to impose rules and standards. It is logical for the lessee to look to
the lessor to control any nuisance that a co-lessee may create.
74
The decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal will not be welcomed by lessors as it
places a higher requirement of care upon lessors. However, the decision is an
acknowledgement of the modern commercial leasing practices and where the element
of control exists, sheeting liability to lessors for breach of the covenant for quiet
enjoyment "is fair and it is reasonable."97
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